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I. INTRODUCTION
Joe Argueta is retired, but he manages to stay busy. 1 He likes to
ride the ferry from Main County, where he lives, to San Francisco,
where he runs into city bus drivers who greet him by name.2 He en-
joys going on cable car rides and meeting new people. 3 Every Tuesday
afternoon, he goes on a date with his girlfriend; he is thinking about
taking her to the beach next time.4 He hangs out at a senior center a
couple times a week, where he makes friends with fellow retirees, and
he occasionally meets up with a friend to shoot some pool.
5
Joe worked at local restaurants for fifteen years. 6 He got along
well with his bosses and coworkers and took pride in his work.7 Joe
knew his role was important; once, on a day off from his food prepara-
tion job at a Fresh Choice restaurant, he went on a scary amusement
park ride and declared, "I can't die! Who will do the potatoes? '8 Joe is
now contemplating coming out of retirement to work one day a week
at a bookstore.9 He lives in his own apartment with one roommate; his
roommate does some of the household chores, but Joe is in charge of
taking out the garbage.' 0 He looks forward to his annual vacation to
Los Angeles and spends holidays with his "adopted" family."l
Joe has not always had such a full and typical life. As a young
man, Joe lived at Sonoma State Hospital, 12 a California institution for
1. Interview with Joe Argueta, Client, and Darien Cash, Cmty. Support Facili-





6. E-mail from Lisa Giraldi, Executive Director, Pac. Diversified Servs., to au-
thor (May 12, 2009, 20:20:49 PST) (on file with author).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Interview with Joe Argueta and Darien Cash, supra note 1.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Sonoma State Hospital, now called Sonoma Developmental Center, con-
tinues to operate; on March 25, 2009, it was home to 655 individuals. State of Cali-
fornia, Department of Developmental Services, Sonoma Developmental Center
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people with developmental disabilities, where he felt alone and be-
came preoccupied with doctors and nurses because he craved the at-
tention he received from them. 13 He was medicated with a variety of
anti-psychotic drugs and was physically and psychologically abused.
14
Like many who lived in institutions, he was likely sterilized. 15 He re-
ceived little or no education and developed behaviors such as rocking,
biting himself, and throwing tantrums, as he tried to cope with the
boredom, loneliness, and stress of life in the institution.
1 6
Population, http://www.dds.ca.gov/Sonoma/SonomaPop.cfm (last visited Mar. 29,
2009). The facility's population has gradually declined from 1,191 on September 28,
1994. Id. The State of California operates four developmental centers, the total pop-
ulation of which has declined from 3,906 on September 28, 1994, to 2,216 on March
25, 2009. See State of California, Department of Developmental Services, Develop-
mental Services Homepage, http://www.dds.ca.gov/DevCtrs/Home.cfm (follow
hyperlinks entitled "Fairview," "Lanterman," "Porterville," and "Sonoma," then fol-
low "Population" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 29, 2009). A fifth California deve-
lopmental center closed in March of 2009. Linda Goldston, After More Than 120
Years, Agnews is Closing This Week, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Mar. 24, 2009.
The State of California has recently opened two smaller residential facilities de-
signed to serve up to fifty-five and sixty-three individuals, respectively, with the
goal of addressing residents' behavioral needs to prepare them to return to commu-
nity settings. State of California, Department of Developmental Services, Sierra Vis-
ta, http://www.dds.cahwnet.gov/SierraVista/Index.cfm (follow "About the Pro-
grams" hyperlink) (last visited May 1, 2009); State of California, Department of
Developmental Services, Canyon Springs, http://www.dds.cahwnet.gov/ Canyon-
Springs/Index.cfm (follow "Programs" hyperlink) (last visited May 1, 2009).
13. Lisa Giraldi, Joe's Journey: From Institutionalization/Segregation to Inclu-
sion 3 (notes from Lisa Giraldi).
14. Id.
15. E-mail from Lisa Giraldi, supra note 6.
16. Id.; Giraldi, supra note 13. For a brief history of the institutionalization
and deinstitutionalization of people with mental disabilities in the United States, see
Joanne Karger, Note, "Don't Tread on the ADA ": Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring
and the Future of Community Integration for Individuals with Mental Disabilities,
40 B.C. L. REV. 1221, 1224-28 (1999). It is important to acknowledge that some of
the more troubling aspects of Joe's experience in the institution are not necessarily
reflective of current practices in such facilities, and that some problems, such as
abuse and neglect, occur in both segregated and integrated settings. See, e.g., Aaron
Zitner, Davis Apology Sheds No Light on Sterilizations in California, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 16, 2003, § 1, at 26 (forced sterilization in California ended in the 1960s); see
Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Representing David: When Best Practices Aren't and Natu-
ral Supports Really Are, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 161, 172 n.30 (2007)
3
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In the late 1960s, Joe's life changed as he, like thousands of others
with mental disabilities, moved out of the institutional setting. 17 He
moved from the state hospital in rural Sonoma to a group home in ur-
ban San Francisco.' 8 Joe's early years outside of the institution were
characterized by confusion, feelings of abandonment after being
moved from the only home he had ever known, and further abuse.' 9
Eventually, with the support of caring service providers, Joe was
able to form friendships, get his first real job, and begin to overcome
the behaviors he developed during his days in the institution.20 Joe,
who used to say "I ain't got no people," 21 can now list the names of
important people in his life.22 Joe's experience is echoed in the lives
of many other formerly institutionalized men and women, 23 both those
with developmental disabilities, 24 like Joe, and those with mental ill-
(noting that "[n]ot everything is rosy in the community, nor everything bleak in in-
stitutions").
17. E-mail from Lisa Giraldi, supra note 6. For a timeline of events relevant to
disability issues, including events that prompted deinstitutionalization, see Michigan
Disability Rights Coalition, Disability History, http://www.copower.org/leader/ Dis-
abilityRightsHistory.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2009).
18. There are some ambiguities in Joe's records; he may have been living at
Agnews, another California institution for people with developmental disabilities, at
the time of his deinstitutionalization. E-mail from Lisa Giraldi, supra note 6.
19. Giraldi, supra note 13, at 4.
20. Id. at 5. Joe receives support in his daily activities from Pacific Diversified
Services, a nonprofit agency that promotes inclusion of individuals with develop-
mental disabilities in typical community settings. See Pacific Diversified Services-
Welcome!, http://www.pdsmarin.org (last visited Mar. 29, 2009). He lives in his
own apartment with a paid roommate who provides the support he needs at home
through a supported living program of Casa Allegra Community Services. See Ca-
sa Allegra Community Services, Supported Life, http://www. casaalle-
gra.org/CACSSL.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2009).
21. Giraldi, supra note 13, at 2.
22. Interview with Joe Argueta and Darien Cash, supra note 1.
23. See, e.g., John v. Jacobi, Federal Power, Segregation, and Mental Disabil-
ity, 29 Hous. L. REv. 1231, 1248-49 (2003) (citing Amici Curiae Brief of National
Mental Health Consumers' Self-Help Clearinghouse, et al., in Support of Respon-
dents at 12-15, Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (No. 98-536),
1999 WL 143940) (describing the enriched lives of formerly institutionalized indi-
viduals).
24. Stedman's Medical Dictionary defines "developmental disability" as a
"loss of function brought on by prenatal and postnatal events in which the predomi-
180 [Vol. 46
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ness, who have made the transition from life in institutions to life in
the community.
25
In the landmark case of Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring,26 the
United States Supreme Court held that unnecessary segregation of
people with mental disabilities in institutions constitutes unlawful dis-
crimination within the meaning of Title II of the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act (ADA).27 Specifically, the Court held that the ADA re-
quires a state to move an individual from an institution to a more
integrated setting when: 1) state treatment professionals have found
that community placement is appropriate for the individual; 2) the
move to a less segregated placement is "not opposed by the affected
individual"; and 3) "the placement can be reasonably accommodated,
taking into account the resources available to the State and the needs
of others with mental disabilities." 28 In the ten years since the
Olmstead decision, much attention has focused on the third criterion
and the scope of states' defense. 29 Less attention has been paid to the
nant disturbance is in the acquisition of cognitive, language, motor, or social skills;
e.g., mental retardation, autistic disorder, learning disorder, and attention-deficit
hyperactivity disorder." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 508 (Maureen Barlow
Pugh ed.) (27th ed. 2000). Legal definitions vary somewhat, but California's is rep-
resentative; California limits "developmental disabilities" to those that originate be-
fore age eighteen, are expected to continue indefinitely, and constitute a "substantial
disability," which is further defined as one that significantly limits functioning in at
least three of these "major life activit[ies]": "(1) Self-care. (2) Receptive and expres-
sive language. (3) Learning. (4) Mobility. (5) Self-direction. (6) Capacity for inde-
pendent living. (7) Economic self-sufficiency." Lanterman Developmental Disabili-
ties Services Act, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 4512(a)(1) (West 2009). California's
definition includes "mental retardation, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, and autism." §
4512(a). Some states use similar definitions but require that the disability originate
before age twenty-two. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 1.03 (McKinney 2009).
25. A woman with schizophrenia who spent most of her life in institutions be-
fore moving to a home in the community with appropriate support explained, "It's
better living in my house ... because you have staff twenty-four hours a day like in
the hospital but you can go to the bank, shopping, or Rite-Aid. It's better out here. It
feels like you're in your normal home. You can't live in the hospital all your life...
I like having power over my own life." Jacobi, supra note 23, at 1248-49.
26. Olmstead, 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
27. Id. at 587.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Jennifer Mathis, Where Are We Five Years After Olmstead?,
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. J. L. & POL'Y, Jan. - Feb. 2005, at 561,564.
2009]
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first two criteria and a question that arises from them: While it is clear
that Olmstead obligates states to deinstitutionalize individuals when
the criteria are met, does it require the converse-that states continue
to provide institutional care when one of the first two criteria is not
met? In other words, does Olmstead create a "right" to continued care
in a segregated environment such as an institution30 when the individ-
ual with a mental disability, or more often, that individual's parents or
other family members, oppose the move to a more integrated commu-
nity placement?
While some writers have prematurely concluded that Olmstead
clearly does not create such a right, 3 1 the case law is conflicting. This
comment asserts that 1) the current state of the case law is sufficiently
unsettled that more litigation will result, hampering states' already
slow progress in complying with Olmstead's integration mandate; 2) a
proper interpretation of Olmstead in light of the ADA's overall pur-
pose ultimately leads to the conclusion that there is no "right" to con-
tinued care in a segregated setting; 3) the implications of a right or
lack of a right to continued services in segregated settings extend
beyond the deinstitutionalization context, making the result more im-
portant; and 4) in light of the state of the law and its likely direction,
professional advocates for individuals with disabilities face special
challenges in serving the needs of their individual clients as well as
the larger goals of the disability rights movement.
Part II summarizes Olmstead, focusing on the reasoning within
the justices' opinions that sheds the most light on whether the Court
intended to impose on states an obligation to provide continued insti-
tutional care under specified circumstances. Part III summarizes the
30. Note that Olmstead is, in theory, implicated not only when deciding
whether an individual has a right to be moved from a traditional institution, but also
when deciding whether an individual has a right to be moved from one community
setting to another. See infra Part IV. The unnecessary segregation barred by the
ADA can occur in varying degrees and in a variety of settings. See infra Part IV.
31. Carlos A. Ball, Looking for Theory in all the Right Places: Feminist and
Communitarian Elements of Disability Discrimination Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 105,
162 n.287 (2002) (stating that "[c]ourts have on the whole refused to read Olmstead
as requiring the continued institutionalization of individuals with disabilities"); Jen-
nifer Mathis, Community Integration of Individuals with Disabilities: An Update on
Olmstead Litigation, 25 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 158, 160 (2001)
(stating that courts have "uniformly rejected" the argument that Olmstead creates a
right to remain in an institution).
[Vol. 46
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conflicting cases addressing this question, describing both the current
unsettled state of the law and the direction it is likely to take. Part IV
describes the potential scope of the Olmstead decision; this back-
ground is essential to a full appreciation of the ramifications of a
"right" or lack of a right to continued care in a more segregated set-
ting. Part V focuses on the implications of the current state and likely
direction of the law for disability rights advocates.
II. OLMSTEAD
Plaintiffs L.C. and E.W.32 are women with mental retardation who
also have mental health diagnoses; L.C. has schizophrenia and E.W.
has a personality disorder. 33 Both women remained in a Georgia insti-
tution even after the doctors responsible for their treatment determined
that their needs could be met in community-based treatment pro-
grams.34 Plaintiff L.C. brought a suit, in which E.W. intervened, in the
Northern District of Georgia. 35 The suit alleged that the state's failure
32. For background on the lives of L.C. and E.W., see Loretta Williams, Long
Term Care After Olmstead v. L.C., 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 205, 222-23
(2000); Karger, supra note 16, at 1246 n.234.
33. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 593. The fact that the two plaintiffs had both deve-
lopmental disabilities and mental health diagnoses may explain the complete ab-
sence of any discussion of the distinctions between the two populations in the
Olmstead decision. See Karger, supra note 16, at 1223 n.12 (noting that the term
"individuals with mental disabilities" is used throughout the opinion without distin-
guishing between developmental and psychiatric disabilities). The deinstitutionaliza-
tion of those with mental illness is somewhat more controversial as individuals with
mental illness often fail to receive adequate services and may become homeless or
be incarcerated after their discharge from institutions. See Ruth Colker, Anti-
Subordination Above All: A Disability Perspective, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1415,
1436 (2007) (asserting that "deinstitutionalization has not been an overwhelming
success" but acknowledging that it has been "generally more successful" for indi-
viduals with developmental disabilities than those with mental illness); Karger, su-
pra note 16, at 1226-27; Tori DeAngelis, Beyond Deinstitutionalization: Reintegra-
tion, MONITOR ON PSYCHOLOGY, Jan. 2007, at 28 (interview with Robert Bernstein
of the Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, who attributes the greater difficulties
in the deinstitutionalization of those with mental illness to poor implementation of
deinstitutionalization plans, fewer resources, and resistance by mental health profes-
sionals).
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to move the women from the institution to community-based treat-
ment programs once their doctors determined such a move was appro-
priate violated Title II of the ADA, which states that "no qualified in-
dividual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the servic-
es, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to dis-
crimination by any such entity."
36
In reaching the conclusion that states' unnecessary segregation of
individuals with disabilities in institutions constitutes discrimination
within the meaning of Title II, the Court looked to the congressional
findings in the opening provisions of the ADA, which summarize the
problems the ADA was meant to address:
(2) historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individ-
uals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms
of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be
a serious and pervasive social problem;
(3) discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in
such critical areas as ... institutionalization... ;
(5) individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms
of discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion... [and]
segregation .... 37
The Court expressly found that these provisions apply to and should
inform the interpretation of the entire Act,38 a notion rejected by Jus-
tice Thomas in his dissent.
39
36. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2009).
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 (a)(2), (3), (5) (2009); Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 588-89.
38. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 588 (stating that the opening provisions are "appli-
cable to the statute in all its parts").
39. Id. at 616-22 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas reasoned that
the opening provisions did not dictate the definition of the word "discrimination" for
the purposes of Title II. Id. He would have held that unnecessary segregation does
not constitute discrimination absent evidence that the state has treated a similarly
situated group more favorably, citing the "traditional" definition of discrimination
applied in interpreting other anti-discrimination statutes. Id. Justice Kennedy was in
partial agreement with Justice Thomas in that he did not read the ADA's opening
provisions to "displace" a traditional definition of discrimination, but rather to em-
phasize that isolation and segregation of people with disabilities were frequent ma-
nifestations of discrimination in the traditional sense. Id. at 613-14 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). Justice Kennedy was not convinced that the plaintiffs had demonstrated
[Vol. 46
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In addition to incorporating the ADA's congressional finding into
its interpretation of Title II, the Court considered two regulations
promulgated by the Attorney General pursuant to Title II. The first,
known as the "integration regulation," 40 requires public entities to
provide services in the "most integrated4' setting appropriate to the
that a similarly situated class of individuals was given preferential treatment, but
thought they might be able to make such a showing and should have the opportunity
to do so on remand. Id. at 614-15. For summaries of the drastically different inter-
pretations of Title II by Justices Ginsburg and Thomas, see Jacobi, supra note 23, at
1238-41; Karger, supra note 16, at 1250-51. One writer has reasoned that the ADA's
definition of discrimination as interpreted in Olmstead embraces communitarian
theory by emphasizing the value of participation in community life, whereas a tradi-
tional definition of discrimination uses a "formalistic approach to equality" in keep-
ing with liberal theory. Ball, supra note 31, at 153-56. John Jacobi describes a "tra-
ditional" definition of discrimination as "trivializing the wrongs done" to individuals
with mental disabilities who are unnecessarily segregated in institutions. Jacobi, su-
pra note 23, at 1246-47.
40. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 592, 596.
41. Id. at 597. The principle that services for people with disabilities should be
provided in the most integrated, or "least restrictive" setting possible has long per-
meated disability rights law. See, e.g., Colker, supra note 33, at 1427-30, 1441
(summarizing and criticizing the history of the "integration presumption" in special
education law, and summarizing the origins of the "least restrictive alternative" con-
cept in constitutional case law); Jacobi, supra note 23, at 1250 (describing the appli-
cation of the "least restrictive alternative" concept in the context of involuntary civil
commitment and later extensions to other aspects of mental disability law); Karger,
supra note 16, at 1236-37 (stating that "[t]he phrase 'least restrictive' has played a
major role in disability litigation during the past twenty-five years"). Although the
term "least restrictive" is historically significant and is a key term in current special
education law, I do not use it in this comment because it is not precisely synonym-
ous with "most integrated," the term used in the integration regulation. Compare 28
C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2009) with 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (2009). "Least restrictive" can
be used to refer to less intrusive or less drastic measures that are not necessarily
more integrated. The term "most integrated," in addition to being more specific,
casts the problem in a positive light, requiring states to examine how individuals can
become more integrated into their communities rather than simply asking states to
refrain from depriving individuals of liberty or dignity unnecessarily. For a discus-
sion of the history of the concept of "least restrictive alternative" as it relates to in-
voluntary commitment of individuals with mental illness, see Michael L. Perlin,
"For the Misdemeanor Outlaw": The Impact of the ADA on the Institutionalization
of Criminal Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV. 193, 214-18
(2000).
9
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needs of qualified individuals with disabilities. 42 The second, the
"reasonable-modifications regulation," provides that a public entity
must make "reasonable modifications" to its policies and procedures
in order to avoid discriminating against individuals on the basis of
disability. 43 The public entity, however, is not required to make mod-
ifications that would "fundamentally alter the nature of the service,
program, or activity."
44
In granting partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs, the dis-
trict court did not allow for a cost-based defense for the State of Geor-
gia; the court treated unnecessary institutionalization as per se dis-
crimination.45 In declaring a per se rule, the district court rejected the
State's argument that being required to immediately deinstitutionalize
an individual whose doctor had deemed the move appropriate would
"fundamentally alter" the State's program. 46 The State argued that,
even though community treatment is less expensive per capita than in-
stitutional treatment,47 the cost of providing community treatment
while continuing to operate institutions (necessary to meet the needs
of those for whom community treatment is not appropriate), would re-
quire the state to fundamentally alter its programs, sacrificing the
well-being of others with mental disabilities to avoid "discrimination"
against those who were entitled to immediate community treatment.
48
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, by contrast, did
acknowledge that a state's duty to provide community treatment was
"not absolute," but found that a cost defense is appropriate in only the
"most limited of circumstances," and remanded the case for considera-
tion of whether the additional cost of treating the two plaintiffs in the
42. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2009). For a critique of the regulation and of courts
as imposing an integration requirement not clearly intended by Congress, see Colk-
er, supra note 33, at 1443-44.
43. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2009).
44. Id.
45. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 595.
46. Id. at 595-96.
47. For an argument that integration efforts are sometimes motivated by poten-
tial cost savings rather than the well-being of individuals with disabilities, see Colk-
er, supra note 33, at 1423 & n.27, 1428. But see Mathis, supra note 29, at 580 (not-
ing that post-Olmstead, states have myopically viewed the development of
community-based services as a financial burden rather than a cost-saving measure).
48. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 594-95.
186 [Vol. 46
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community was "unreasonable given the demands of the State's men-
tal health budget."
'4 9
The Supreme Court rejected the Eleventh Circuit's version of a
cost defense. A plurality portion of Justice Ginsberg's opinion rea-
soned that it would be virtually no defense at all for states since the
cost of providing services in the community for one or two plaintiffs
would always seem reasonable compared to a state's entire budget for
mental health services.50 The Court held instead that a state may in-
voke the "fundamental alteration" defense by showing that "imme-
diate relief to the plaintiffs would be inequitable, given the responsi-
bility the State has undertaken for the care and treatment of a large
and diverse population of persons with mental disabilities, 5 1 and the
need to "administer services with an even hand."52
In developing its three-pronged test, the United States Supreme
Court handed the disability community what has been viewed as a
substantial victory; it affirmed that unjustified segregation of people
with disabilities is unlawful discrimination. 53 But the Court also
strengthened states' cost-based defense, drawing criticism.54 Some
49. Id. at 595-96.
50. Id. at 603-04 (plurality opinion).
51. Id. at 604.
52. Id. at 587. The fundamental alteration defense, as elaborated in the plurali-
ty portion of Justice Ginsberg's opinion, is summarized in Karger, supra note 16, at
1248-49.
53. Rosemary L. Bauman, Note, Disability Law, Needless Institutionalization
of Individuals with Mental Disabilities as Discrimination Under the ADA-
Olmstead v. L.C., 30 N.M. L. REv. 287, 393 (2000) (noting that Olmstead's accep-
tance of a broader definition of discrimination is significant given courts' earlier nar-
row construction of various aspects of the ADA); Karger, supra note 16, at 1249-50
(stating, in 1999, that "Olmstead offers great promise" and is "an important begin-
ning of the realization of community integration"); Robert F. Rich et. al., Critical
Legal and Policy Issues for People with Disabilities, 6 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L.
1, 32 (2002) (calling Olmstead "a victory... in [the] quest for equal access to ade-
quate and appropriate pubic services").
54. RUTH COLKER, THE DIsABILITY PENDULUM 130-31 (2005) (criticizing the
Olmstead decision as improperly creating a cost defense where Congress did not in-
tend to allow one); Karger, supra note 16, at 1240 (stating that "[o]ne commentator
believes that Congress instructed the Department of Justice to omit the undue hard-
ship provision with respect to cost" (citing Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with
Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 393, 430-31 (1991));
2009]
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feared that the defense would "swallow the rule" of Olmstead,55 a pre-
diction that has not come to fruition.5 6 The Court's holding is the fol-
lowing:
States are required to provide community-based treatment for per-
sons with mental disabilities when the State's treatment profession-
als determine that such placement is appropriate, the affected per-
sons do not oppose such treatment, and the placement can be
reasonably accommodated, taking into account the resources avail-
able to the State and the needs of others with mental disabilities.
57
It is unlikely that the Court anticipated the use of its three-pronged
test to argue that the ADA ever required states to keep anyone in an
institution. Justice Thomas, in his dissent, hinted at possible problems
of this nature when he accused the majority of imposing "a standard of
care '58 rather than banning discrimination. Although the Court expli-
citly stated that it was not creating a standard of care, 59 the language
the Justices used throughout their opinions, which was intended to ac-
knowledge the difficult position states find themselves in and express
respect for states' decision-making, is nevertheless useful to those
who interpret Olmstead as imposing the unintended duty on states to
keep individuals in institutions when one of the three criteria is not
met.
The majority emphasized that "nothing in the ADA or its imple-
menting regulations condones termination of institutional settings for
persons unable to handle or benefit from community settings, ' 60 ex-
Karger, supra note 16, at 1251 (calling the third prong of the holding the "greatest
obstacle to the goal of community integration").
55. Bauman, supra note 53, at 303. See Karger, supra note 16, at 1223, 1258-
64 (describing the holding's third prong as "disappointing" and sharply criticizing
the Supreme Court's formulation of the fundamental alteration defense as providing
states with too much freedom to avoid community integration).
56. See Mathis, supra note 29, at 564-72 (summarizing the various ways
courts have limited the fundamental alteration defense).
57. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 607.
58. Id. at 623 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 604 n.14 (majority opinion).
60. Id. at 601. The National Council on Disability, in a 2003 report on
Olmstead issues, explained that the argument in favor of a right to continued institu-
tional care "relies on the dicta" quoted here. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY,
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plaining that the ADA only requires that "qualified" individuals, de-
fined by the ADA as those who meet "the essential eligibility re-
quirements"61 for a particular service, be deinstitutionalized.62 Justice
Ginsberg stated in the plurality portion of her opinion that for some
individuals, "no placement outside the institution may ever be appro-
priate. 63 This language is clearly intended to limit, not expand, what
the ADA requires of states. Justice Kennedy expressed concerns about
the consequences of deinstitutionalization in his concurrence for the
purpose of emphasizing that states must not be forced to deinstitutio-
nalize people for whom such changes are not appropriate. However,
Justice Kennedy's expressions of concern would, at least when taken
out of context, reinforce the view that states may not deinstitutionalize
certain individuals. Justice Kennedy pointed out that "the depopula-
tion of state mental hospitals has its dark side" 64 for those with mental
illness who often face homelessness and lack of treatment in commu-
nity settings. He stressed that it would be "tragic" to "drive those in
need of medical care and treatment out of appropriate care into set-
tings with too little assistance and supervision" and implored courts to
"apply today's decision with greatest deference to the medical deci-
sions of... treating physicians."65
Perhaps more problematic to a proper interpretation of the three-
pronged test and more useful to those arguing that Olmstead obligates
states to continue institutional care when the three criteria are not met
is the Court's discussion that there is no "federal requirement that
OLMSTEAD: RECLAIMING INSTITUTIONALIZED LIVES (2003), available at
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2003/reclaimlives.htm#ChapII (under
heading 2) [hereinafter RECLAIMING INSTITUTIONALIZED LIVES].
61. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2009).
62. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 602.
63. Id. at 605 (plurality opinion).
64. Id. at 609-10 (Kennedy, J. concurring). Justice Kennedy emphasized the
results of deinstitutionalization for individuals with mental illness, who often stop
taking medication outside of the institutional setting and whose ability to function
deteriorates as a result. Id. The phenomenon he describes is a significant factor in
making deinstitutionalization more controversial and problematic for those with
mental illness than for those with developmental disabilities. See Olmstead, 527
U.S. at 593; see also Karger, supra note 16, at 1256 (describing Justice Kennedy's
"fear" as arising from the "negative connotations" surrounding deinstitutionaliza-
tion).
65. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 610 (Kenney, J., concurring).
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community-based treatment be imposed on patients who do not desire
it.,, 66
The second prong of the Olmstead test is properly interpreted to
mean that "[i]f an individual opposes community placement, the ADA
does not require a public entity to accommodate the individual by
transferring him or her into the community." 67 The Court cites for this
proposition a Title II regulation that states: "Nothing in this part shall
be construed to require an individual with a disability to accept an ac-
commodation.., which such individual chooses not to accept" 68 and
the preamble to that regulation, which states that "persons with dis-
abilities must be provided the option of declining to accept a particular
accommodation.
'" 69
The Court's purpose for citing the regulation and preamble ap-
pears harmless; the Court appears to be trying to emphasize, again,
that states will not be treated as discriminating for failure to deinstitu-
tionalize a person who opposes the move. But by stating that there is
"no federal requirement that community-based treatment be imposed
on patients who do not desire it,"7° and then citing the regulation and
preamble, the Court appears to reinforce its proposition by pointing to
a contrary "federal requirement." In other words, the Court appears to
be suggesting not only that states are not required to deinstitutionalize
someone who opposes the move, but that they are, on the contrary, re-
quired to provide such a person the option of declining community
placement in favor of institutional care. The language of the preamble,
quoted out of context as it is in the opinion, appears to leave room for
the argument that regulations implementing Title II create an affirma-
tive duty for states to "provide[] the option" 71 of continued institutio-
nalization when a person "chooses not to accept" 72 community treat-
ment. While the use of the words "must be provided" suggests an
affirmative duty, a closer reading of the preamble reveals that it pri-
marily envisions situations in which a public agency offers a person
66. Id.
67. Mathis, supra note 31, at 158 (emphasis added).
68. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(e)(1) (2009).
69. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A (2009).
70. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 602.
71. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A (2009)
72. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(e)(1) (2009).
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with a disability something special or separate as an accommodation,
but the person prefers to instead participate in the services provided to
the general public. This language is most likely meant to guard against
the creation of new forms of segregation under the guise of "accom-
modation," not to entitle people to continued segregation.
73
Even if the regulation obligates states to provide individuals with
disabilities the "option" of declining any particular community place-
ment offered to them, it does not necessarily follow that the state has
the additional duty to continue to provide institutional care. At most,
the regulation, as expanded upon in the preamble, emphasizes that
people with disabilities may "take or leave" state services, not that the
state must continue to provide services in a segregated form.
The ease of slipping into an incorrect interpretation of Olmstead is
demonstrated by the discussion of the "individual does not oppose"
prong in a case note published shortly after the Olmstead decision was
issued.74 In "Don't Tread on the ADA": Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel.
Zimring and the Future of Community Integration for Individuals with
Mental Disabilities, Joanna Karger stated that "[t]he second condition
included as part of the Court's holding is that the affected individual
must not oppose the community placement." 75 The sentence suggests
that if the "condition" is not met, a state must not deinstitutionalize the
individual in question, when it would be more accurate to say that if a
person opposes the move, a state may keep the person in an institution
without "discriminating." Karger's discussion focuses on the signific-
ance of the terms "affected individual" and "does not oppose" rather
than on whether the prong creates a condition under which a state
must not deinstitutionalize a person. The use of the word "must" ap-
73. The commentary in the preamble appears to be an attempt to guard against
"accommodations" that segregate people with disabilities and frustrate the ADA's
goals:
[T]he public entity must administer services, programs, and activities in
the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals
with disabilities, i.e., in a setting that enables individuals with disabilities
to interact with nondisabled persons to the fullest extent possible, and that
persons with disabilities must be provided the option of declining to ac-
cept a particular accommodation.
28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A.
74. Karger, supra note 16, at 1254-55.
75. Id. at 1254 (emphasis added).
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pears to be inadvertent; a court would later make the same mistake by
assuming that a state may not deinstitutionalize a person who opposes
the move.
76
Karger's thorough note anticipated many issues that would arise
from the Olmstead decision.77 It did not, however, anticipate the ques-
tion of whether the three-pronged test creates a "right" to institutional
care, demonstrating how easily Olmstead's test can inadvertently be
reversed and wrongly interpreted to set forth not only circumstances
under which continued institutionalization is discrimination, but also
circumstances under which moving someone out of an institution is
discrimination.
The confusion that is created in Olmstead by language that ap-
pears to be supportive of the argument for an ADA-based right to in-
stitutional care flows from the Court's discussion of hypothetical con-
ditions beyond the facts of the case. It was undisputed that the
Olmstead plaintiffs' doctors had determined that community place-
ment was appropriate for the plaintiffs, and that they not only were
unopposed to community treatment, but wanted it badly enough to
sue.7 8 The court, in belaboring the limits79 of its holding out of an ab-
undance of caution, inadvertently fueled an unintended interpretation
of the holding. The question of what Olmstead means when the three
criteria are not satisfied would play out in future cases, but with no
clearer results.
III. THE CONFLICTING CASE LAW REGARDING STATES' OBLIGATION TO
PROVIDE CONTINUED CARE IN SEGREGATED SETINGS
Courts have offered a confused assortment of responses to the ar-
gument that Title II of the ADA obligates states to continue to provide
76. See infra Part III.C.
77. See, e.g., Karger, supra note 16, at 1252 (exploring the possible ramifica-
tion of the first prong when an individual disagrees with the state's treatment profes-
sionals about proper placement); id. at 1255 (asking whether the term "affected in-
dividual" in the second prong might be interpreted to refer to a parent or guardian
rather than the individual with a disability); id. at 1255-56 (discussing the words
"not oppose" in the second prong as creating an "easier condition" than consent).
78. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 602-03 (1999).
79. See REcLAIMING INSTrUTIONALIZED LivEs, supra note 60 (citing Black v.
Dep't of Mental Health, 83 Cal. App. 4th 739 (2000)).
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institutional care when Olmstead's three criteria-treatment profes-
sionals' decision that community care is appropriate, the individual's
lack of objection, and the state's ability to reasonably accommodate
the placement 8 -are not met. The relevant cases, considered below in
chronological order, all involve efforts by families to prevent their
disabled relatives from being moved into community settings in the
midst of either states' efforts to comply with Olmstead by moving
people out of institutions, or other families' efforts to compel states to
provide community care pursuant to Olmstead.
A. Richard C.: The Federal Courts' First Encounter
with the Question
Just three months 81 after the Supreme Court's decision in
Olmstead, a United States district court took up the question in an
auspicious but uncertain decision. A number of residents of a Penn-
sylvania institution called Western Center filed a class action lawsuit
against Pennsylvania's Secretary of the Department of Public Welfare,
and the parties reached a settlement agreement. 82 Four residents of the
Center and their "legal guardians and/or family members" filed two
motions to intervene as of right,83 in part on the basis that moving res-
idents out of the Center (which the Department of Public Welfare had
closed) despite their objections violated Olmstead.84 In rejecting the
argument that Olmstead obligated states to provide continued institu-
tional care, 85 the district court emphasized that the Supreme Court in
80. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 607.
81. Olmstead was decided June 22, 1999; Richard C. ex rel. Kathy B. v. Hous-
toun, 196 F.R.D. 288, 289 (W.D. Pa. 1999) was decided September 29, 1999.
82. Richard C. ex rel. Kathy B. v. Houstoun, 196 F.R.D. 288, 289 (W.D. Pa.
1999), aff d sub nom. Richard C. v. Snider, 229 F.3d 1139 (3d Cir. 2000).
83. Richard C., 196 F.R.D. at 289.
84. Id. at 290-91.
85. One writer described the case as holding "that the state could choose to
place a person with a disability in a less restrictive setting against the will of the per-
son with the disability" and called the case "potentially troubling precedent" because
institutional care is generally more expensive than community care. Rich, supra note
53, at 33. This concern about deinstitutionalization as a cost-saving measure rather
than one motivated by concern for the well-being of individuals served is echoed in
Ruth Colker's article. See supra note 54.
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Olmstead decided when the ADA requires states to move people to
more integrated settings in order to avoid discriminating against those
with disabilities by segregating them without justification.
86
While the Supreme Court acknowledged that states needed "lee-
way" to accommodate those who might need to remain in institutional
care and was careful not to "impel States to phase out institutions," the
court in Richard C. emphasized that it "does not logically follow that
institutionalization is required if any one of the three Olmstead criteria
is not met.",87 In other words, the case focused on the big picture-that
Title II of the ADA, by its nature an anti-discrimination law, bans un-
justified segregation, a form of discrimination. It does not convert any
possible placement decision that is arguably less than ideal, whether it
is to a more integrated or less integrated setting, into a form of dis-
crimination. 88 In the words of the Supreme Court, Olmstead, in inter-
preting Title II, "does not create a standard of care," but rather holds
"that States must adhere to the ADA's nondiscrimination requirement
with regard to the services they in fact provide."
89
While the court in Richard C. took the time to address the argu-
ment that Olmstead had been violated, it did not address the movants'
other grounds for intervening and instead denied their motions as un-
timely.90 Therefore, while the case seemed to reach a sound conclu-
sion about whether Olmstead ever obligates states to continue institu-
tional care, it did so in dicta. A California state court would soon
address the issue and reach a compatible conclusion.
B. Black: A Sound State Court Decision in a Tragic Case
The plaintiff in Black was the brother and conservator of Craig
Black, a man with a mental illness who was moved out of a California
state hospital to a privately owned mental healthcare facility.91 While
living in the private facility, Craig Black was given incorrect dosages
86. Richard C., 196 F.R.D. at 292. See Rich, supra note 53, at 33.
87. Richard C., 196 F.R.D. at 292.
88. Mathis, supra note 31, at 160.
89. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 603 n.14 (1999).
90. Richard C., 196 F.R.D. at 295-96.
91. Black v. Dep't of Mental Health, 83 Cal. App. 4th 739, 743 (2000).
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of lithium and died as a result.92 The plaintiff sued the State Depart-
ment of Mental Health in California state court. Plaintiff alleged that
the state violated the ADA when it placed Craig in the private facili-
ty.93 Plaintiff did not allege that his brother was improperly moved to
a more integrated setting, but rather that the private facility was a less
integrated setting "because [it] was not a facility that could meet [de-
cedent's] treatment needs." 94 While plaintiff argued the reverse of
what is argued in the other cases examined here, the result is neverthe-
less consistent with Richard C. in finding that Olmstead did not create
a standard of care which requires a state to keep a person in an institu-
tion when one or more of the three criteria is not met. Plaintiff alleged
that Olmstead's first criterion was not satisfied because Craig was not
moved to the private facility on the basis of an assessment that it was
appropriate for him.95 Instead, the placement was based upon "what
was available," as the hospital where he had been receiving treatment
was closing.
96
Black followed in Richard C.'s footsteps in holding that the ADA
does not create a standard of care;97 the court declared, "[W]e do not
believe [Olmstead] was either holding or signaling that a medically
inappropriate transfer from institutionalization to community place-
ment is, by itself, a violation of the integration mandate." 98 As the Na-
tional Council on Disability explained, "The fact that the state may
92. Id.
93. Id. at 744.
94. Id. at 746-47.
95. Id. at 754.
96. Id. at 746-47; RECLAIMING INSTITUTIONALIZED LIVES, supra note 60.
97. In attempting to forecast the conclusion courts would reach about whether
deinstitutionalization can constitute discrimination under the ADA, writers have tak-
en note of a federal district court's order in Richard S. v. Department of Develop-
mental Services, a case in which several residents of a California developmental
center sought to prevent individuals from being discharged from the center. A.B.A.,
Community-Home-Based Services, 24 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP.
890, 891 (2000). The court ruled that the "premature discharge" of developmental
center residents "may be a bad medical decision or poor policy, [but] it does not
constitute disability-based discrimination." Id.; Richard S. v. Dep't of Developmen-
tal Servs., No. SA CV 97-219-GLT (ANX) (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000). See Mathis,
supra note 31, at 160; RECLAIMING INSTITUTIONALIZED LIVES, supra note 60.
98. Black v. Dep't of Mental Health, 83 Cal. App. 4th 739, 755 (2000).
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not, in a particular case, have a duty to transfer an institutional resi-
dent to the community [because one of the three prongs is not satis-
fied] does not translate into an affirmative duty to keep him or her in
an institution." 99 In other words, the Supreme Court, in creating the
three-pronged test, was "merely identifying the outer limits of a state's
duties under the integration mandate, not establishing new ones." 100
Black, in addition to reinforcing that Olmstead's test does not
create conditions under which integration violates the ADA, also
serves to illustrate two important points. First, to say that the ADA
does not obligate states to continue to provide care to people with
mental disabilities in less integrated settings is not to say that there is
not or should not be any legal recourse available when states conduct
themselves irresponsibly in serving people with mental disabilities,
whether in moving people to more integrated placements or otherwise.
The court in Black pointed out that if the state had misled the plaintiff
about the kind of facility where his brother would be placed, as the
plaintiff alleged, the court did "not condone" such conduct and that it
"may be actionable under other theories."' 0' In a regulation entitled
"Relationship to Other Laws"'1 2 and in the preamble to the Title II
regulations, the Attorney General made clear that state tort claims "are
not preempted by the ADA."' 10 3 For integration to be optimally effec-
tive, it must be provided with the proper level of support to meet each
individual's needs, and the ADA does not remove any existing legal
responsibility states may have to provide adequate care.
However, it is important not to confuse the conviction that states
ought to provide care in a responsible fashion with a belief that the
ADA, whose purpose is to define and proscribe discrimination, ought
to provide a remedy for flawed, but not discriminatory, decisions by
states in the care of individuals with disabilities.
99. RECLAIMING INSTITUTIONALIZED LIVES, supra note 60, at ch. 3 § 2(ii).
100. Id. (quoting Black, 83 Cal. App. 4th at 755).
101. Black, 83 Cal. App. 4th at 752 n.10.
102. 28 C.F.R. § 35.103 (2009) (stating that "[t]his part does not invalidate or
limit the remedies, rights, and procedures of any other Federal laws, or State or local
laws (including State common law) that provide greater or equal protection for the
rights of individuals with disabilities or individuals associated with them").
103. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A (2009).
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Second, it is clear that parents' and other relatives' fears about
what might happen if their loved ones with disabilities are moved to a
less restrictive setting are sometimes well-founded. As Joe's story
demonstrates, the horrors of abuse and neglect can happen in institu-
tional and community settings alike, and the transition to community
living is not always smooth. 0 4 It is important to acknowledge this fact
if family members are to be allies in efforts to secure high-quality,
more integrated services for individuals with disabilities.
0 5
While the notion that the ADA and Olmstead do not require states
to provide continued institutional care seemed to gain momentum in
Richard C. and Black, a Pennsylvania court would soon reach a con-
trary conclusion.
C. In re Easly: Losing Sight of the ADA's Purpose
The Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, as part of its ef-
fort to comply with Olmstead's integration mandate, petitioned the
court to have seventy-two-year-old Ruth Easly, who had a develop-
mental disability and had lived in a state institution for most of her
life, committed to a community group home over her guardian's ob-
jections.'0 6 A state appellate court found that to deinstitutionalize Ms.
Easly over her guardian's objections was tantamount to doing so over
her own objections, and that the second criterion of Olmstead was
therefore not satisfied.'07
With no discussion of the contrary argument, the court assumed
that Olmstead obligated states to keep individuals in institutions when
the three criteria are not met.108 To justify its holding that the state
could not move Ms. Easly to a group home over her guardian's objec-
tions, the court not only ignored the ADA's overall purpose but also
104. See supra pp. 178-79 and note 16.
105. Stephen Rosenbaum, a disability rights attorney and parent of an individ-
ual with a disability, cautions against an overzealous focus on integration to the ex-
clusion of other factors in decisions about how and where individuals should receive
services. Rosenbaum, supra note 16, at 166-69, 171-79. He also warns attorneys not
to allow their focus on integration to breed mistrust of or hostility toward parents of
individuals with disabilities. Id.
106. In re Easly, 771 A.2d 844, 846-47 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001).
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resorted to two lines of reasoning that further call its decision into
question.
First, the court resorted to describing Ms. Easly's disability in ca-
tastrophic and demeaning terms. The court listed her levels of func-
tioning in terms of "mental age,"' 10 9 a concept that perpetuates inap-
propriate stereotypes about people with cognitive disabilities and has
historically been used to exclude them from settings that are chrono-
logically age-appropriate."° The court described Ms. Easly's "mental
age" as, in various skill areas, "one year, ten months," "two years,
eight months," "one year, six months," and "two years, one month." ''
Ironically, the court then listed Ms. Easly's hobbies, all of which are
age-appropriate for a seventy-two-year old woman: "looking at the
pictures in magazines, watching television, and going to church."
' 112
In addition to speaking of Ms. Easly's "mental age," the court de-
scribed her "debilitating" medical problems, including a hernia,
"hypercholesterolemia" (high blood pressure), "seborrhea" (dermati-
tis, a common skin condition), and "asteorosis" (it appears that the
court meant "osteoporosis").' 1 3 The court emphasized that Ms. Easly
required medications, including "skin lotion."'1 14 The apparent purpose
of the description of Ms. Easly's disability and health concerns was to
emphasize how inappropriate community placement was for her.
Many seventy-two-year-olds without cognitive disabilities likely list
hernias, high blood pressure, osteoporosis, or skin rashes among the
conditions they live with day to day. Such routine conditions do not
make evident an individual's need for commitment to a state institu-
tion. While the court's description of Ms. Easly seems almost comical,
this kind of reasoning-which focuses on what is "wrong" with a per-
son-has traditionally been used to justify placing individuals with
109. Id. at 846.
110. See Samuel Flaks, Note, Nathan Isaacs' IDEIA: Legal Evolution and Pa-
rental Pro Se Representation of Students with Disabilities, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
275, 284 (2009) (describing a statute that allowed schools to exclude children who
had not achieved a "mental age" of five years, and the reforms in the law inspired by
the statute).
111. Easly, 771 A.2d at 846.
112. Id. at 846-47.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 846.
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disabilities in unnecessarily segregated settings. It is just this sort of
flimsy justification that the ADA is meant to address.
1 15
Second, and more significantly, the court converted the "individu-
al does not object" prong of the Olmstead test into a requirement of
legally cognizable "consent."11 6 This strained interpretation of the
ADA ignores the ADA's preference for more integrated settings,
which is reflected in the careful choice of the words "does not object."
The ADA treats more integrated settings as the default choice, which
states may deviate from if an individual with a disability objects to
such a placement. The court, by requiring "consent," converts the
most segregated setting possible into the preferred or default setting
and creates a high threshold for allowing a person to be moved out of
such a setting. Under Easly's ADA interpretation, individuals with
significant disabilities could easily be deprived of the opportunity to
experience life in more integrated settings. While parents' and family
members' concerns about integration are a factor that must be dealt
with under a proper interpretation of the ADA, it could become a
more significant obstacle to states' efforts to comply with Olmstead's
integration mandate if Easly controlled.
The dissent in Easly, in finding that Ms. Easly's guardian was not
entitled to decide whether she could be transferred from the institution
to a group home, stated that the ADA's proscription of discrimination
"does not conversely translate into having the right to oppose the
transfer from a more restrictive setting."'1 17 Although the dissent did
not go so far as to acknowledge that Olmstead's three prongs create no
obligation to continue institutional care as Black and Richard C. did, it
spoke of Ms. Easly in more respectful terms. 1 8 It acknowledged that
individuals with disabilities who have legal guardians should them-
selves be involved in decisions about where they will live.
119
In light of conflicting state cases and a district court case that an-
swers the question at hand only in dicta, a circuit court decision re-
garding whether the ADA requires states to provide institutional care
115. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) (2009) (listing "overprotective rules and pol-
icies" among the forms of discrimination people with disabilities encounter).
116. Easly,771 A.2d at 851-53.
117. Id. at 865.
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when one of the Olmstead criteria is not met could provide much
needed clarity. The next decision, unfortunately, failed to provide such
clarity.
D. Ligas: No Clarification from the Seventh Circuit
Ligas was a class action suit brought on behalf of individuals with
disabilities who lived in Illinois institutions but were capable of living
in the community. 120 The plaintiffs sought to require the state to pro-
vide care in community settings. 12 The "Golden Intervenors,"' 22 a
group of representatives of "patients who could live in the community
but do not want to, preferring instead to remain in institutional care,"
sought to intervene, fearing that they would be forced into community
care. 123 The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied
the Golden Intervenors' petition for intervention as of right and its al-
ternative request for permissive intervention, and the intervenors ap-
pealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. 124 The court ultimate-
ly affirmed the denial of intervention as of right on the basis that the
Golden group had not demonstrated that "the disposition of the action
threaten[ed] to impair [their] interest" and that the existing parties
"fail[ed] to represent adequately their interest."'
25
The appellees also argued that the Golden group did not "possess
an interest related to the subject matter"1 26 of the suit, relying on Ri-
chard C.'s conclusion that Olmstead and the ADA do not create a
"right" to continued institutional care for individuals who oppose
community placement. 127 The court brushed aside this argument with
apparent irritation in a brief footnote: "The appellees make a cursory
120. Ligas ex rel. Foster v. Maram, 478 F.3d 771, 773 (7th Cir. 2007).
121. Id.
122. The group of "Golden Intervenors" is named after one of the proposed
intervenors in the group. Id. at 773 n. 1.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2); Ligas, 478 F.3d at 773-74.
126. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
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and fragmented argument that the Golden group has no legally recog-
nizable interest in the right to live in institutional settings.
1 28
The "cursory," but not especially "fragmented" argument in ap-
pellees' brief was that "[t]he Golden Intervenors identify their 'inter-
est' in this lawsuit as 'not being denied a meaningful right to institu-
tional care"'1 2 9 and that "[a]t least one court has held that Olmstead
does not create a 'right' to institutional placement that would justify
intervention in a community integration lawsuit."'1 30 Appellees' brief
proceeded to quote language from Richard C. stating that "it does not
logically follow that institutionalization is required if any one of the
three Olmstead criteria... is not met."'
31
Because the appellees did not hang their hat on the argument that
Olmstead does not create a "right" to continued institutionalization,
and because the court found ample grounds to deny intervention with-
out it, Ligas missed the opportunity to bring clarity to the confusion
created by Richard C., Black, and Easly.
While the language of the ADA, with its focus on unnecessary se-
gregation as a form of discrimination, supports the view that the
Olmstead holding only dictates when states must move individuals to
more integrated settings, not when they must continue to provide more
segregated settings, the uncertainty created by the four cases discussed
above leaves the door open for further litigation by those who feel that
integrated settings are not appropriate for their loved ones with dis-
abilities. To understand the potential ramifications of such litigation, it
is important to understand fully the implications of Olmstead for an
array of services for people with disabilities.
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF OLMSTEAD FOR
DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION AND BEYOND
In the immediate wake of Olmstead, states were faced with an ob-
vious requirement to take steps toward providing community-based
128. Ligas, 478 F.3d at 773 n.2 (citing Richard C.).
129. Initial Brief: Appellee-Respondent at 20, Ligas, 478 F.3d 771 (No. 06-
1327).
130. Id. at 20 n.4 (citing Richard C.). The appellees' brief, like the court's de-
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services to people with mental disabilities who no longer needed to
live in institutions. Ten years later, it is important to consider both
what Olmstead meant and continues to mean for the deinstitutionaliza-
tion process, and perhaps more importantly, what implications
Olmstead has for efforts to ensure that people with mental disabilities
have access to the "most integrated setting appropriate"' 32 along a
spectrum. 133
A. Olmstead and the Deinstitutionalization Movement
One criticism of the Olmstead decision is that it provided states
with little concrete guidance as to how they should conduct them-
selves in order to comply with the call to avoid discriminating against
institutionalized individuals with mental disabilities, given that the
states' obligation to deinstitutionalize is not absolute. 34 If states do
not have to immediately deinstitutionalize everyone who is capable of
living in the community, what should they do? In a plurality portion of
the Olmstead decision, 135 Justice Ginsburg suggested a means by
which a state might demonstrate that it has met its obligation to deins-
titutionalize people who can live in the community while also satisfy-
ing its obligation to "maintain a range of facilities" and "administer
services with an even hand" to the diverse population of people with
132. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2009).
133. The two major implications of Olmstead discussed here are far from the
only potential ramifications of the decision. See Perlin, supra note 41, at 228-39
(expressing hope that Olmstead would lead to changes in practices that subject mis-
demeanor and non-violent felony criminal defendants with mental illness to pro-
longed maximum-security confinement); Karger, supra note 16, at 1223 (asserting
that "the ruling will have an impact on those with physical disabilities as well").
134. See, e.g., Ligas, 478 F.3d at 773 (commenting that "with three dissenters
and multiple concurrences, including a swing vote that joined in only part of the
opinion, Olmstead has left the exact route to implementing this integration mandate
somewhat murky.").
135. Part III.B of the opinion was joined by Justices O'Connor, Souter, and
Breyer. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 587 (1999). Justice Stevens,
who joined the rest of Justice Ginsburg's opinion, wrote a concurrence in which he
asserted that the Court should have simply affirmed the judgment of the court of ap-
peals, which had remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration of the
state's cost defense. Id. at 607-08 (Stevens, J. concurring).
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mental disabilities who receive state services. 136 Justice Ginsburg sug-
gested that if a state could "demonstrate that it had a comprehensive,
effectively working plan for placing qualified persons with mental
disabilities in less restrictive settings, and a waiting list that moved at
a reasonable pace not controlled by the State's endeavors to keep its
institutions fully populated," it would have satisfied its obligation un-
der Olmstead.1
37
Although not binding, Justice Ginsburg's "comprehensive plan"
portion of the opinion has, in practice, been followed by at least one
court1 3 8 and by many states. Of the fifty states and District of Colum-
bia, twenty seven have published documents they describe as
"Olmstead plans," while another seventeen have published documents
described as "alternative strategies."'1 39 Whether all of these efforts by
states to demonstrate that they have effectively working plans to move
people out of institutions has measurably hastened the pace of actual
deinstitutionalization is, of course, a separate inquiry; there has been
some criticism of the slow pace of deinstitutionalization post-
Olmstead. 
140
136. Id. at 587.
137. Id. at 605-06 (plurality opinion).
138. Frederick L. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 422 F.3d 151, 155-57 (3d Cir.
2005) (holding that a state could not invoke the fundamental alteration defense when
it had failed to "demonstrate a commitment to community placement" through a
"comprehensive, effectively working plan" including measurable goals that would
allow the courts to hold the state accountable). See also Makin v. Russell, 114 F.
Supp. 2d 1017, 1035 (D. Haw. 1999), cited in Mathis, supra note 31, at 159 (treating
the waiting list method as one way of demonstrating that the state has met its obliga-
tion under Olmstead). For a discussion of Frederick L., see Mathis, supra note 29, at
570-71.
139. See Center for Personal Assistance Services, University of California,
San Francisco, State Olmstead Plans and Alternative Strategies,
http://www.pascenter.org/olmstead/olmsteadplans.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
See also Mathis, supra note 29, at 561-62 (2005) (explaining that states have created
plans pursuant to Olmstead but that implementation of those plans has "remained
modest" and that progress toward community integration has been "disappointingly
slow").
140. See Mathis, supra note 29, at 561-62; Samantha A. DiPolito, Comment,
Olmstead v. L.C.-Deinstitutionalization and Community Integration: An Awaken-
ing of the Nation's Conscience?, 58 MERCER L. REv. 1381, 1381 (2007)
2032009]
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As the process of moving people with mental disabilities out of
institutions proceeds, the most obvious potential ramification of litiga-
tion that asserts a "right" to continued institutional care under
Olmstead is the further slowing of deinstitutionalization. When small
groups of families seek to intervene in community integration class
actions as they did in Richard C. and Ligas, they threaten to delay or
even prevent relief for the larger class of people with disabilities who
want the opportunity for a life in the community promised by
Olmstead. Smaller-scale cases like Easly tie up state resources that
might otherwise have furthered a state's efforts to comply with
Olmstead, and suits for damages such as Black have the potential to
make state officials reluctant to change anyone's placement for fear
that any misstep could constitute actionable "discrimination." But
even the most extreme result possible, within the context of deinstitu-
tionalization, is arguably somewhat limited in its potential impact.
California's progress in reducing the population of its state develop-
mental centers exemplifies the slow but steady progress that is under-
way. The total number of individuals living in institutions is small
considering the state's large population and the total number of people
with developmental disabilities served by the state.
141
Nevertheless, Olmstead, and therefore the answer to the question
at hand, remain important for two reasons. The first is that Olmstead is
still an important tool in litigation where states have been especially
slow to comply. 142 The second reason is discussed below.
141. See supra note 13. At the end of March 2009, California Regional Cen-
ters served a total of 202,311 "active clients," 2,357 of whom were placed in deve-
lopmental centers. DEP'T OF DEV. SERVS., STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Monthly Consum-
er Caseload Report (Mar. 2009), available at http://www.dds.cahwnet.gov/
FactsStats /docs/Mar09_caseload.pdf. The number of individuals living in develop-
mental centers given in the report appears to include individuals in the state's two
newer, smaller residential facilities described at supra note 13. Especially given that
Olmstead emphatically does not hold that states must deinstitutionalize those who
"are unable to handle or benefit from community settings," it is at least arguable that
California is nearing the point at which it will have complied with Olmstead by re-
ducing the populations in its institutions for people with developmental disabilities
to the individuals who need institutional care. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 602. Whether
this is true depends on how one defines "institution." See infra note 152.
142. According to Equip for Equality, an Illinois disability advocacy group
that served as co-counsel in Ligas, Illinois ranked fifty-first among the states and
District of Columbia for placing people with developmental disabilities in the com-
204 [Vol. 46
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B. Olmstead's Implications for Services in More Integrated Settings
Along a Spectrum
The facts of Olmstead specifically required the Court to decide
when the ADA's proscription of discrimination in the form of unjusti-
fied segregation requires a state to move a person out of the most se-
gregated setting possible-an "institution"-and into some less segre-
gated setting. But whether a setting is "segregated" or "integrated" is
not an all-or-nothing inquiry. Integration is not "binary;" 143 "commu-
nity-based" services fall everywhere along the spectrum in terms of
how integrated they really are. 144 Olmstead on its facts moves states
toward minimizing the most obvious and egregious form of unneces-
sary segregation. 145 However, its underlying principles also obligate a
state to move an individual further along the spectrum. The "integra-
tion regulation" relied upon by the Court requires that services be pro-
vided, not merely "outside of traditional institutions," but "in the most
integrated setting appropriate" to an individual's needs.
146
munity as of November 2008, when it announced the proposed consent decree in the
case. Press Release, Equip for Equality et al., People with Developmental Disabili-
ties Celebrate Agreement with State in Landmark Case (Nov. 13, 2008), available
at http://www.equipforequality.org/news/pressreleases/ligasmaramfiles.php (follow
hyperlink under heading "Press Releases"). That group has in recent years fought
efforts by the State of Illinois to reopen an institution that was ordered closed in
2002. Equalizer Online Fall 2006, http://www.equipforequality.org/news/equalizer/
fall2006/Olcommunity.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2009). Clearly, the struggle for
deinstitutionalization is far from over in Illinois. See also Mathis, supra note 29, at
573-77 (highlighting important Olmstead class actions against several states, includ-
ing California). In 2005, Mathis viewed Olmstead litigation as "the most viable ave-
nue" to obtain services in integrated settings due to states' slow progress in comply-
ing with Olmstead. Id. at 582. Furthermore, in considering the continued relevance
of Olmstead in deinstitutionalization, it is important to be mindful of the impact of
long waits for community care in the lives of individuals with disabilities and their
families, even when only small numbers of individuals are impacted. For an account
of one young man's experience, told by his conservator, see Barbara Bromley, Free
at Last: One Family's Journey of Deinstitutionalization, J. OF CHILD AND FAM.
STUD., June 2003, at 125-34.
143. Jacobi, supra note 23, at 1251.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1247.
146. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2009); Jacobi, supra note 23, at 1250-51.
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Joe Argueta's life provides a concrete example of the integration
spectrum. 147 Sonoma State Hospital represents the most segregated
setting possible, both as a residence and as a place to spend his "work
day." Joe's success with Pacific Diversified Services (PDS) and Casa
Allegra demonstrate that for him, full inclusion in typical community
settings with support from staff is the most integrated setting appro-
priate for his daytime activities and that a regular apartment in the
community, with live-in support from a paid roommate, is the most in-
tegrated home setting appropriate to Joe's needs. 148 When Joe first
moved out of the institution, he lived in a group home with a number
of other people with disabilities. 49 This setting was more integrated
than the state hospital, but more segregated than supported living. He
attended a "sheltered workshop" during the day, where many individ-
uals with disabilities congregated in one building to do menial work
and other activities under staff supervision. 150 In the sheltered work-
shop, he spent his day in a setting more integrated than the state hos-
pital but more segregated than the community settings he accesses
with help from PDS. 15 1 If a move from one setting to another along
the spectrum is appropriate for an individual's needs, 152 that individual
does not oppose it, and a state can provide it without fundamentally
altering its programs, Olmstead is no less applicable than in the case
of an individual living in a traditional institution.1 53 For example,
147. See supra text accompanying notes 1-22.
148. E-mail from Lisa Giraldi, supra note 6 (summarizing Joe's progress and
successes in the community setting).
149. Id.
150. Id. One former participant in a sheltered workshop program describes the
difference between sheltered workshops and supported employment in the commu-
nity, saying that "to me [the sheltered workshop] looked like an institution or a
warehouse" and that "[i]f people work out in the community, they develop a wider
range of contacts, unlike going to a segregated building every day." MICHAEL J.
KENNEDY, CTR. ON HUMAN POLICY, SYRACUSE UNIV., FROM SHELTERED
WORKSHOPS TO SUPPORTED EMPLOYMENT (1988), http://thechp.syr.edu/ kdy-
work.htm.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 2-12.
152. Jacobi, supra note 23, at 1253 (citing DAVID BRADDOCK ET AL., THE
STATE OF THE STATES IN DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILIrIES 13 (5th ed. 1998)).
153. Jacobi, supra note 23, at 1251. Jacobi also notes that efforts to comply
with Olmstead should focus not only on individuals living in institutions, but those
206 [Vol. 46
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someone like Joe should be able to invoke Olmstead to require the
state to move him from a group home to an apartment with supported
living services if he can demonstrate that the three criteria are met.
1 54
In a society that is moving (if, by some accounts, too slowly)1
55
away from housing people with disabilities in traditional institutions,
it would be easy to miss the full importance of Olmstead and its re-
quirement that states work toward providing services in the most inte-
grated setting appropriate for each individual. However, when one ac-
knowledges the unlawful discrimination that occurs when people
spend decades living in settings that amount to "mini-institutions,"'
' 56
and as a result miss the opportunity to live fuller, more normal lives,
the scope and potential longevity of Olmstead come into focus. Even
living in the community who need better services to avoid being institutionalized. Id.
at 1250-51.
154. Another way to look at the applicability of Olmstead to integration along
a spectrum is to describe a person as being "institutionalized" when he lives in a se-
gregated setting such as a group home, even though such a setting looks different
from a state hospital, the stereotypical "institutional" setting. Mathis, supra note 29,
at 561 and n.5, in describing the ongoing problem of slow progress pursuant to
Olmstead, states that many individuals remain "unnecessarily institutionalized" in,
inter alia, "board and care facilities." Mathis characterizes the problem as one of
"transinstitutionalization" of people from state-operated to privately operated institu-
tions. Id. at 581. The argument framed in this manner may be more palatable to
skeptical courts, sounding less like an extension of Olmstead and more like the
straightforward application of Olmstead to "institutions" despite superficial differ-
ences in the forms those institutions may take. A settlement agreement was recently
approved in a California lawsuit that defined an "institution" as a residential facility
that houses sixteen or more individuals with disabilities. Memorandum from Barba-
ra Dickey & William Leiner, Attorneys with Disability Rights California, to Inter-
ested Persons 2 (Apr. 27, 2009), available at http://www.disabilityrightsca.org/ ad-
vocacy/CPFvDDS/Summary-ofSettlement-2009-04-27.pdf. This definition
encompasses many types of facilities other than developmental centers, including
"skilled nursing facilities, and large private Intermediate Care Facilities and Com-
munity Care Facilities." Id. at 3. Under this definition, the class of "institutiona-
lized" Californians included not only the roughly 2,300 individuals living in Deve-
lopmental Centers, but also another 4,500 people living in other facilities. Press
release, Disability Rights California, Major Lawsuit Settled, Helping 7,000 People
with Developmental Disabilities Live in the Community Instead of Institutions (Apr.
27, 2009), available at http://www.disabilityrightsca.org/advocacy/
CPFvDDS/PressRelease-2009-04-24.pdf.
155. See Mathis, supra note 29, at 561-62; DiPolito, supra note 140, at 1381.
156. Jacobi, supra note 23, at 1252.
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if every large state institution were to eventually close its doors,
Olmstead would provide the standard for when states must provide
people with disabilities more integrated settings, both for residential
and day services, in which to live their lives. Given the great impor-
tance of Olmstead, the question at hand also becomes more important:
Do Olmstead's three criteria obligate states to continue to provide care
in a more restrictive setting when the criteria are not met, namely,
when the individual with a disability or, more often, his family mem-
ber, objects to the more integrated setting? The uncertainty created by
Richard C., Black, Easly, and Ligas has the potential to hamper
progress along the spectrum if individuals with disabilities and their
families invoke Olmstead to try to prevent services from being pro-
vided in more integrated settings.
V. CONCLUSION
After the four cases that grapple with the argument that states can
"discriminate" on the basis of disability by moving a person with a
disability to a more integrated setting, several things are clear. First,
more litigation, driven by family members' concerns about more inte-
grated settings, will likely occur until the law becomes more settled.
Second, the ultimate answer to the question is likely to be that
Olmstead does not lay out conditions under which a state may be
found to have discriminated under the ADA by moving someone to a
more integrated setting. The reasoning in Richard C. is the most per-
suasive and the most compatible with the ADA's purpose, which is to
eliminate discrimination against people with disabilities in various
forms, including unnecessary segregation. Reasoning similar to that in
Richard C. will, most likely, ultimately prevail. Third, until the ques-
tion is answered clearly, at least at the circuit court level, the persist-
ing litigation will hinder efforts by states, individuals, and families
who seek community care to shift services away from more segre-
gated settings toward more integrated settings. This challenge will
manifest itself not only in the context of deinstitutionalization, but al-
so in contexts in which people seek more integrated services along a
spectrum. Fourth, with the foregoing in mind, disability advocates,
particularly those who work for organizations whose larger objective
is to advance the rights of all people with disabilities, will face partic-
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ular challenges in deciding whether and how to represent clients who
wish to argue that Olmstead creates a right to institutional care. 1
57
Megan Chambers*
157. Interview with Stephen Rosenbaum, Staff Attorney, Disability Rights
California, in Oakland, Cal. (Mar. 27, 2009). Mr. Rosenbaum explained that there is
often a tension between an attorney's obligations to his client and his responsibilities
to the purposes of an organization that uses advocacy in individual cases to work
toward larger goals. He explained that different attorneys handle the dilemma diffe-
rently; sometimes it is necessary to turn down a case that is incompatible with the
organization's mission, and sometimes an attorney might use a very specific retainer
agreement to ensure that the client understands that his or her case is being accepted
with the understanding that his or her goals in the case are compatible with the goals
of the organization. Id. The tension experienced by public interest attorneys is sum-
marized in Dean Hill Rivkin, Reflections on Lawyering for Reform: Is the Highway
Alive Tonight?, 64 TENN. L. REv. 1065, 1066-69 (1997). Rivkin states that attorneys
have been "accused by many of trying to save the world, of being lawyers for caus-
es, not clients." Id. at 1066.
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